The UK needs a new electoral system – should it copy Scandinavia?
Proportional voting is, at least philosophically speaking, the best electoral system.
Torbjörn Tännsjö, Professor of Practical Philosophy, Stockholm University
11 August 2025
Calls for electoral reform are rising in the UK, where a majority of people are now in favour of a different system. It’s easy to see why. A voting system based on having one MP for one constituency, elected via one-person-one-vote, only works well when there are two political parties competing for a position in each constituency rather than multiple parties.
The two-party system invites an unsound party culture in which “entryism” – infiltrating a party to subvert it – is the only method left for people who want to take part in politics but who don’t feel attached to any party. The system also brings little incentive for the two main parties to develop particularly different stances on any issue because they are competing for the same electorate.
Is there an alternative? Of course, there is. Just look at the Scandinavian countries, where a representative method is used for electing parliaments.
The parties present lists of candidates, and they are elected in groups to represent each constituency in proportion to how the electorate votes. For example, in Sweden there are 29 constituencies (valkretsar) and the total number of representatives to the parliament is 349. This means that the main parties gain proportionate representation in all constituencies.
There are also a few extra seats in the parliament given to the parties in order to rectify a remaining slight lack of proportionality. There is a 4% hurdle however, which means a slight distortion – in the interest of efficiency – of the idea of perfect proportionality.
This system means that, figuratively speaking, the people in Scandinavia rule themselves through their parliaments.
There are many positive aspects to such systems and hardly any principled drawbacks. At least this is the judgement I make as a philosopher. I leave the empirical matter to political scientists.
Democratic decision-making
To decide which system is, philosophically speaking, more desirable, we first need to define what it means for a collective of people to reach a decision in a democratic manner.
You could say that a collective decision made by a group has been made in a democratic manner if it has been reached by a mechanism guaranteeing that, if a majority exists in the group, then the collective decision is in accordance with this majority will. The standard mechanism is to rely on majority voting, of course.
We should also add that it is because the final decision is the will of the majority that it has prevailed.
What if no unique majority will exists because of a draw? In that case, it is left for the chairman to decide. Sometimes this happens – and it is a theoretical problem for majoritarian democratic decision-making – but in practice it is always possible to handle it.
Swedish ballot papers featuring lists of candidates for each party.Shutterstock/Martin of Sweden
A democratic decision can only be reached if there are political agents such as voters or members of the parliament prepared (and allowed) to voice their opinions (in an appropriate manner).
The representative ideal
Once democratic decision-making has been defined, it is possible to articulate different ideals in terms of democracy. In each political ideology there is some room for democratic decision-making.
It is therefore possible to specify which decisions should, and which decisions should not, according to a certain political ideology, be taken in a democratic manner – as well as who should make those decisions. In some systems the president is democratically elected by the people directly, in other systems a prime minister is democratically elected by a parliament, and so forth.
The British parliament uses a democratic method of decision-making. The election of a representative in each constituency is also democratic – so long as only two candidates are in serious competition for the position. Either your candidate wins or your candidate loses because the majority want the other person to represent them.
The will of the majority is decisive. But when there are more than two candidates (and of course, in practice there are), a candidate lacking support from a majority can be – and often is – elected.
The representative model is different. The parliament reaches decisions through a democratic decision process but elections to that parliament are not democratic. Instead, they are proportionate, meaning candidates disliked by a majority can be elected. Even small parties get (proportionate) representation.
There is a democratic rationale behind a system of this kind, where representatives of the people gather, put forward proposals, discuss them, and have a vote. This is the idea that the decision the representatives reach will be the one those who are represented would also have reached, had they been able to gather in the same manner.
A proportionate system also guarantees representation for politically disliked minorities. They can enter the parliament even if no constituency exists where they are liked by a majority.
In parliament they can at least argue their case and, if it is a good one, gain support for it in the long run. This system is the best answer to Aristotle’s fear that a majority may come to oppress various minorities. It is not foolproof – but collective decision-making is a risky business in the first place.
Finally, the system meets the Platonist elitist objection that people aren’t good enough to rule themselves. In the proportionate system they rule themselves, but indirectly, and through trusted political experts. There is little reason to believe that the single individual who gets the upper hand in a single-member constituency is good enough to be your ruler.
So, my friendly advice to the people of the UK, at least from a philosophical perspective, is to adopt some version of the Scandinavian model.
Torbjörn Tännsjö does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license.