Egypt recently deepened its involvement in the war-weary Horn of Africa by arming Somalia and deploying its troops in the embattled country. To Ethiopia’s growing alarm, Egypt is also set to join the multinational force supporting the Somali army against the jihadist threat by al-Shabaab. Egypt’s potentially destabilising presence in the region is seen a direct consequence of Ethiopia’s port agreement with breakaway Somaliland, which Somalia took as a direct affront. Endalcachew Bayeh, a political scholar with a focus on the Horn of Africa, sets out the risks and the path to de-escalation.
What do we know about Egypt’s entry into Somalia and the theatre of conflict in the Horn?
Egypt’s arrival in the Horn of Africa can be traced back to Ethiopia’s quest for a dedicated port under its control. Ethiopia is the world’s largest landlocked country by population and has relied exclusively on the port of Djibouti since the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1998-2000).
Ethiopia has been exploring alternative access points. This led to the announcement on 1 January 2024 that it had struck a port deal with Somaliland. Ethiopia agreed to recognise the breakaway republic in exchange for a naval base on Somaliland’s coast.
The announcement sparked a diplomatic rift with Somalia, which viewed the deal as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Somalia still considers self-declared Somaliland part of its territory.
Amid the turmoil, Somalia courted Egypt as a regional patron to counter Ethiopia. This aligned well with Egypt’s increasing interest in finding a military partner along Ethiopia’s border.
Egypt is a longstanding rival of Ethiopia. Recently, it threatened to go to war over Ethiopia’s massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which it sees as a threat to its survival.
Egypt deployed military forces in Somalia following its defence deal with Mogadishu in August 2024. It also plans to deploy 5,000 soldiers as part of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia. The mission is set to replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, in which Ethiopia is a main player.
Ethiopia’s agreement to recognise Somaliland and the friction with Somalia have brought its old enemy, Egypt, to its doorstep.
How have Egypt-Ethiopia hostilities added to regional tensions?
Soon after Egypt’s deployment in Somalia, Ethiopia formalised its recognition of Somaliland. It also sent an ambassador to the capital, Hargeisa. This made it the first nation to officially acknowledge Somaliland’s independence. The two are also rushing to turn their memorandum of understanding into a binding bilateral treaty.
Somaliland ordered the closure of the Egyptian Cultural Library in Hargeisa.
Eritrea, for a time a key ally of Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed in the fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, is now at odds with Addis Ababa. And, in response to the recent tensions in the region, Eritrea is strengthening its ties with Egypt and Somalia. A recent meeting of the three has created a united front against Ethiopia.
In Somalia, Ethiopia plays a stabilising role. Somalia now demands that Ethiopia should end its involvement. That could open the way for militant groups and keep Somalia unstable. This is even more likely to happen if Egypt focuses on its competition with Ethiopia rather than Somalia’s stability.
In addition, Somalis have longstanding territorial claims over parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Instability can create fertile ground for groups like Al-Shabaab, which aims to include these territories in an Islamic state.
Finally, tensions have risen between Djibouti and Somaliland over the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal. This is because the agreement will almost certainly be bad for Djibouti’s economy. Djibouti relies heavily on port revenues that are almost entirely generated from Ethiopia.
What are the risks for the region?
Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland and Egypt’s presence in Somalia come at a time of multiple regional crises. These include the strained Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, the Ethiopia-Sudan dispute over Al-Fashaga border region, and instability in Ethiopia.
This volatile environment increases the likelihood of proxy wars.
Key areas to watch are:
Sudan and Egypt: These two countries align on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam issue. Egypt has enhanced its security cooperation with Sudan through military support and joint exercises. Although Sudan is in turmoil, the Al-Fashaga dispute with Ethiopia remains a potential flashpoint. Egypt may take advantage of this dispute and its support for the Sudanese Armed Forces against the Rapid Support Forces to further its interests.
Instability in Ethiopia: In several regions, the government is engaged in active conflict with non-state forces. This instability creates fertile ground for Egypt to potentially support proxies against the Ethiopian government. Egypt and Somalia have already expressed the possibility of using proxy forces.
Egypt’s main motivation for intervening in the region is to control the Nile’s source or hinder Ethiopia’s use of the water. As a result, Ethiopia perceives Egypt’s presence at its doorstep as a direct security threat. This increases tensions between Egypt, Somalia and Ethiopia.
Any further destabilisation of Ethiopia would disrupt the entire region, as it shares porous borders with almost all countries in the Horn.
What are the potential avenues for de-escalation?
A promising pathway for reducing tensions in Somalia and the broader region is for the two regional powers to reconsider their strategies and exercise restraint.
Ethiopia can access the sea through Somaliland without formal recognition. This could ease tensions and would not encourage separatist movements.
For Egypt, a more constructive approach would be to limit its direct involvement in the Horn of Africa. Instead, it should address its concerns about the Ethiopian mega-dam through the United Nations, the African Union and other platforms. Historically, its unilateral actions have often been sources of tensions rather than solutions in the region.
The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development must ensure that the regional states themselves address regional issues. States must make wise decisions now to calm tensions, as no state will be spared from the spillover effects.
Endalcachew Bayeh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
